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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks is the new concept in the 
field of networks consists of small, large number of 
sensing nodes which is having the sensing, 
computational and transmission power. Due to lack of 
tamper-resistant infrastructure and the insecure 
nature of wireless communication channels, these 
networks are vulnerable to internal and external 
attacks. Key Management is a major challenge to 
achieve security in wireless sensor networks. Key 
management includes the process of key setup, the 
initial distribution of keys and keys revocation. To 
provide security and proper routing or communication 
should be encrypted and authenticated. It is not easy to 
achieve secure key establishment without public key 
cryptography. In this thesis, some key management 
schemes have been purposed which will be valuable for 
secure routing between different sensor nodes. 
 
Keywords: Security, Design, Sensor networks, Key 
management, Algorithms 
1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks consist of spatially distributed 
sensors to co-operatively monitor physical or 
environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, 
vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants. When sensor 
networks are deployed in a hostile environment, security 
becomes extremely important, as they are prone to 
different types of malicious attacks. For example, an 
adversary can easily listen to the traffic, impersonate one 
of the network nodes, or intentionally provide misleading 
information to other nodes. The flexibility, fault tolerance, 
high sensing fidelity, low-cost and rapid deployment 
characteristics of sensor networks create many new and 
exciting application areas for remote sensing.  
 
Key Management includes the processes of key setup, the 
initial distribution of keys and key revocation. To provide 
security and communication should be encrypted and 
authenticated. The open problem is how to bootstrap 
secure communications between sensor nodes, i.e. how to 
set up secret keys between communicating nodes. This 
problem is known as the key agreement problem. There 
are three types of general key agreement schemes: trusted-
server scheme, self-enforcing scheme, and key pre-
distribution scheme. The trusted-server scheme is not 
suitable for sensor networks  because there is no trusted 
infrastructure in sensor networks. The self-enforcing 
scheme that depends on asymmetric cryptography is 
inapplicable for using public-key algorithms due to limited 
computation and energy resources of sensor nodes. The 
third type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution, 
where key information is distributed among all sensor 
nodes prior to deployment. If we know, which nodes will 
be in the same neighbourhood before deployment, keys 
can be decided a priori. However, most sensor network 
deployments are random; thus, such a priori knowledge 
does not exist. Thus, we have to make tradeoffs between 
security and the available resources while designing an 
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security. The key management schemes must establish a 
key between all sensor nodes that must exchange data 
securely, node addition or deletion should be supported, 
Security services such as authentication and key 
management are critical to secure the communication 
between sensors in hostile environments. The  key 
management schemes that we are going to present, must 
establish a key between all sensor nodes that must 
exchange data securely, node addition or deletion should 
be supported, It should work in undefined deployment 
environment, unauthorized nodes should not be allowed to 
establish communication with network nodes. The 
proposed key management protocols have been presented 
in detail. 
1. When a sensor node wants to communicate with another 
sensor node, they need to be authenticated with each other 
first. Motivated by this, we proposed an Authentication 
Scheme without storing direct key information in the 
memory of individual sensor nodes. 
2. Two communicating nodes need to have a pair wise key 
for secure communication. We  proposed a pair wise key 
establishment scheme by using a counter. 
3. Compromised nodes could deviate the network 
behaviour by injecting false data or modifying data of 
correct nodes. Thus, compromised nodes should not be 
taking part in the group communication. To solve this 
problem we proposed the key management scheme for 
node revocation. 
 
 
2. Related Work 
 
All key management schemes can be categorized in to two 
types i.e. pre-distribution key management schemes where 
key information is distributed among all sensor nodes 
prior to deployment and in Insitu key management 
schemes which does not require keying information prior 
to deployment .This key pre-distribution can be divided 
into several categories based on Key Pool, Random Pair 
Wise Key, Key Space, Group, grid-based etc. In key pool 
based scheme, a large key pool is computed offline and 
each sensor is preloaded with keys Selected randomly 
without replacement from the key pool. These keys form a 
sensor’s key ring. Laurent Eschenauer and Virgil D. 
Gligor proposed a probabilistic key pre distribution 
scheme[2]. The main idea was to let each sensor node 
randomly pick a set of keys from a key pool before 
deployment so any two-sensor nodes sharing at least one 
common key. Donggang Liu and Peng Ning [9] presented 
a key management scheme where sensors can be added 
dynamically without having to contact the previously 
deployed sensors. This scheme allows the network to 
grow. In 2003 Chan et al proposed the Random pair wise 
scheme [3]. The random pair wise scheme possesses 
perfect resilience against node capture attacks as well as 
support for node based revocation and resistance to node 
replication. In 2009 Stephen Anokye et al [6] made 
improvements on Chan et al’s Random pair wise scheme. 
This scheme significantly reduces the memory and 
computational overheads and it has better connectivity. In 
that year Du et al proposed a pair wise key predistribution 
scheme that is scalable and flexible. It is substantially 
more resilient against node capture. In 2005 Zhen Yu and 
Yong Guan proposed a group based key pre distribution 
scheme [11] using sensor deployment knowledge where a 
sensor field is partitioned into hexagonal grids. It consists 
of a series of methods depending on how to distribute 
secret information among neighbouring groups and how 
much information to be stored in each node which 
achieves a higher degree of connectivity of the sensor 
network with a lower memory requirement and offers a 
stronger resilience against node capture attacks. In 2006 
R. Kalindi et al proposed a Grid based Key Pre-
Distribution Scheme [12] for Distributed Sensor Networks 
that uses multiple mappings of keys to nodes. In each 
mapping, every node gets distinct set of keys, which it 
shares, with different nodes. The key assignment is done 
such that, there will be keys in common between nodes in 
different sub-grids. After randomly being deployed, the 
nodes discover common keys, authenticate and 
communicate securely. This scheme is able to achieve 
better security. Being motivated by the above key 
management schemes, some protocols have been 
developed for solving some of the important security 
issues that are encountered in Wireless sensor networks. 
 
3. Proposed Key Management Schemes 
 
Conventional key exchange and key distribution protocols 
based on infrastructures using trusted third parties are 
impractical for large-scale sensor networks because of the 
unknown network topology prior to deployment, 
communication range limitations, intermittent sensor-node 
operation, and network dynamics. To date, the only 
practical options for the distribution of keys to sensor 
nodes of large-scale distributed sensor networks whose 
physical topology is unknown prior to deployment would 
have to rely on key pre distribution. Keys would have to 
be installed in sensor nodes to accommodate secure 
connectivity between nodes. Security services such as 
authentication and key management are critical to secure 
the communication between sensors in hostile 
environments. Here three schemes have been proposed i.e. 
authentication, pair wise key establishment and a scheme 
for node revocation in an existing sensor network. The 
proposed key management schemes are presented in 
detail. 
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3.1 Authentication Scheme between two Individual 
Sensor Nodes: 
When a sensor node wants to communicate with another 
sensor node, they need to be authenticated with each other 
first. In this scheme, it is assumed that no key information 
will be stored in individual sensor nodes; instead, every 
key information will be stored at a high-end sensor node 
i.e. the master node. By protecting only that master node, 
we can make the entire sensor network secure. The 
scheme is shown through an algorithm explained below. 
1. Assuming the case of sensor node A and sensor node B 
in the network wants to securely communicate with each 
other.  
2. The master node must contain keys of all sensor nodes 
i.e. K1, K2, K3... Kn and id’s of all sensor nodes and 
encrypted form of there ids with their corresponding key 
i.e. (IDA) K1,(IDB)K2, (IDC)K3,…… prior to deployment. 
The key is only available with the master node. Here 
sensor node A contains IDA and (IDA)K1 and sensor node 
B contains IDB and (IDB)K2 . 
3. Sensor node A generates a random number i.e. Nonce A 
and computes the MAC using (IDA)K1 and Nonce A .  
4. Subsequently node A sends a message i.e. 
IDA||NonceA|| MAC {(IDA)K1|| Nonce A} to sensor node 
B.  
5. Upon receiving the message, Node B tries to calculate 
the MAC for authentication. But as the key is only 
available with the master node so, sensor node B generates 
a random number i.e. Nonce B after getting the message 
from sensor node A and sends a message i.e. 
NonceA||NonceB|| IDB ||H{(IDB)K2}|| IDA to the master 
node to verify the identity of sensor node A.  
6. Master node recognizes IDB and then authenticate by 
computing the hash over the {(IDB)K2 }which is with the 
master node. After authenticating node B from the 
message received from sensor node B and becomes sure 
about the validity of the message and confirm about the 
validity of sensor node A by sending (IDA)K1 to sensor 
node B.  
7. Sensor node B then computes MAC {(IDA)K1|| Nonce 
A} and compares it with the MAC present in the message 
coming from sensor node A . If those two MACs match 
with each other then it becomes sure that Sensor node A is 
a valid node in the network and communication with it is 
safe. 
 
FigCaption1: Authentication Procedure 
While node B communicating with the master node, if any 
adversary takes away all the communicated data ,it would 
be of no use as the (IDB)K2 of node B at node B had 
already been changed to (IDB)K2+ NRANDA , and similarly 
at the master node the change to the (IDB)K2 to(IDB)K2+ 
NonceA also takes place. So the data communicated 
between node B and master node if intercepted is of no 
use. Once master node  authenticate node B the  master 
node can directly send the Nonce B to node A .So that 
node A can update (IDA)K1 to (IDA)K1+NonceB and the 
same updation is also being carried out by the master 
node. Thus authentication between two sensor nodes is 
performed in the proposed scheme. Authentication is done 
solely by the master node. 
 
3.2 Pair-Wise Key Establishment among two 
individual Sensor Node 
In the pair wise techniques, generally a key used to 
establish a secure channel between a couple of nodes, 
where no one can use this channel to perform any type of 
communication without of the permission of the owner 
node of the key itself. 
 
1. Let us consider there are two nodes having id U and V, 
want to communicate with each other. The node U 
computes its key KU as KU = FK(U) .Here FK is a function 
and the node id U is an input to the function. Similarly the 
node V computes its key KV as KV = FK(V).  
2. Node U computes its pair wise key KUV = KU (V) = 
FK(UV) and node V computes its pair wise key KUV = KV 
(U) = FK (UV).  
3. After the establishment of the pair wise key they start to 
transmit message to each other. Any message M is 
encrypted as M= KUV(M). A counter is set to keep records 
of transmitted message. With each transmission the 
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same message get encrypted differently each time which 
creates confusion for the attacker to decipher the key, as 
the key keeps changing with each transmission. 
 
FigCaption2: Pair wise key establishment mechanism 
 
4. After transmission of one message, the counter value is 
changed to some value C and the pair wise key between 
the sensor nodes becomes updated by that value i.e. KUV = 
FK(UV+C). A message M can be encrypted as M= 
KUV(M) = FK(UV+C)(M). 
 
The main task of this scheme is to minimize the used 
memory for storing the different keys of the WSN, in 
addition to generating a strong and robust environment 
against any possible attack, and in case of any attack, the 
scheme should be flexible and fast in recovering. 
 
3.3 Key management scheme for node revocation in the 
network 
As the sensor nodes deployed in a network has the 
different limitations, hence in turn they get malicious or 
compromised and they hamper secure communication in 
the network by incorporating incorrect information or 
modifying data at other nodes in the network. This leads to 
the origination of an idea of assuming a private symmetric 
key called group key, which is used to transfer the 
messages within the group. When a compromised node is 
found, the current group key must be cancelled or revoked 
and a new key must be provided to all the group members 
except the compromised or malicious node. Hence it leads 
to the removal of the compromised Sensor node. 
The protocol is efficient and scalable as it limits both 
communication and computation overhead during 
rekeying. This scheme follows an approach of node 
management (NM) that cancels the current group key and 
distributes a new group key to all the nodes except the 
compromised one and in turn forces the compromised 
nodes to leave the group.  
 
The node revocation procedure lies on the concept of   
group  key set up phase, where  a sender(G) wants to 
communicate with the receiver node(H) .In the key set up 
phase G creates a  key-set, a sequence of values < P0. . .  Pi 
. . .PN >, where each key is linked to other ones by means 
of a hash function H. G randomly chooses the end-key PN 
and then iteratively applies the one-way function H for N 
times in order to obtain the start-key at the beginning of 
the chain. That is, 
 P i = H (Pi+1),   ( 0 ≤  i < N) 
Each key in the set (except the start-key) is the hash 
preimage of the previous one in the direction of the start 
key. That is, the key Pi  is the hash preimage of Pi+1 . 
The node revocation scheme is explained in the following 
steps. 
1. Assume that each sensor node shares a secret symmetric 
key that shares with NM and is denoted by P
q
ln  i.e.; the 
key of the sensor node ln. 
2. To remove a malicious node lm,  NM maintains a 
stepwise structure of symmetric keys, called the node-
revocation tree. 
3. NM associates each internal node ta of the node 
revocation tree with a chain composed of Nta keys and 
each leaf node with the secret key of a group member.   
Initially, the current-key of the internal node ta , P
ta
cur, 
corresponds to the start-key, P
ta
0.Thus, in the setup phase 
current keys contains only the start-keys. 
4. A sensor node ln stores a set of current keys, key ring(ln) 
can be defined as, KeyRing(ln) = {P
ta
cur | ta € Path(ln )}, 
where Path(ln) be the set of internal nodes lying on the 
path from the root to the leaf associated with ln. The key-
set KeyRing(ln) is composed of the current-keys associated 
with the internal nodes in Path (ln). 
5. Every group member stores a copy of the current-key 
associated with the tree root, P
t1
cur, because it belongs to 
the key-set of every group member. Thus, this key acts as 
the group-key. 
6. When a sensor node lm is compromised and NM has to 
renew them, but it isn’t renewed for lm. 
FigCaption3: Node revocation scheme 
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of ta,  NM broadcasts a rekeying message structured as 
follows. Every message contains the next-key of ta, P
ta
nxt. 
If the ta ’s child is a leaf and it is not associated with P 
q
lm, 
P
ta
nxt is encrypted with the private-key of the 
corresponding group member. If the ta’s child is an 
internal node (i,e; tc)  and is not included in Path(lm), P
ta
nxt  
is encrypted with P
tc
cur. If tc  is included in Path(lm), P
ta
nxt  
is encrypted with P
tc
nxt. 
8. After this procedure, for each internal node ta belonging 
to path lm, P
ta
cur is replaced by P
ta
nxt. Hence the leaf node 
with P
q lm is removed by the NM. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Security is the major concern in the wireless sensor 
networks. The communication of information between the 
sensor nodes gets tampered due to the malicious behaviour 
of the network. Hence in this paper, three schemes are 
discussed for secure routing between the sensor nodes 
using the concept of key management. The authentication 
scheme maintains an efficient and secure communication 
between two different nodes. The pair-wise key 
management scheme enforces security in terms of one 
private paired key. The third scheme explains one scheme 
for the problem of insecure behaviour of a compromised 
node, where the compromised node is revoked from the 
group to make the network more secure, efficient and 
scalable. 
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